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1 INTRODUCTION
Being invited to give the Tinbergen Lecture is a privilege for any economist.
But for me it is also a great pleasure as it brings back to me memories of,
not just a great economist who won the ﬁrst Nobel prize in Economics, but
of a great humanist whose example affected me deeply.
I ﬁrst met him in Cambridge, Massachusetts, when I was a student at MIT
and he was a Visiting Professor at Harvard. He was kind enough to invite me,
among other students, to his home for dinner. I recall his saying, with a sense
of puzzlement rather than deprecation, that many of his Harvard students had
come to him just before the ﬁnal examination, and had asked him: When you
put down dy/dx, why don’t you cancel out the ‘d’? Well, that could not have
been a question asked by MIT students! Perhaps that was why, when Profes-
sor Paul Samuelson, my teacher and then colleague and now friend, wished us
to understand why the Stolper–Samuelson theorem worked because the trade-
induced reallocation of resources changed the capital/labor ratios in both goods
in the same direction, he said: imagine that the worst student at MIT ﬂunks
out and joins Harvard; the average IQ in both MIT and Harvard goes up.
But my next meeting was more dramatic. I had gone as a youthful OECD
“consultant” to work for 3months in the Devlet Planlama Teskilati, Turkey’s
Planning Commission, in 1962. There I was, staying at a posh hotel, earning
∗ This is the ﬁnal text of the Tinbergen Lecture delivered to the Royal Netherlands Economic
Association in Amsterdam in October 2006. The author is University Professor, Economics and
Law, Columbia University, and Senior Fellow in International Economics at the Council on For-
eign Relations. His latest books, Free Trade Today (Princeton, 2002) and In Defense of Globaliza-
tion (Oxford, 2004) present the economic case and the social case for globalization and for free
trade, respectively in far greater depth than a Lecture permits. Some of the arguments in this Lec-
ture will be developed further in a substantial Afterword to the new edition of In Defense of Glob-
alization that will be issued in the Summer of 2007 by Oxford University Press.
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an indecent salary that vastly exceeded my experience and policy compe-
tence, when Professor Tinbergen arrived to help the Planning Commission.
He stayed in a modest hotel; and I was told that he was charging no consult-
ing fee. He was there, quite simply, to do good. For him, development of the
poor countries was a vocation, not a profession. I resolved then to emulate
him; and indeed, while like him I have earned my reputation through scien-
tiﬁc work, I have spent much of my career, also trying to do good. Indeed, the
scientiﬁc scholarship must precede the ability to inﬂuence policy in the diverse
ways that one can today. As Bertrand Russell once said: unless you have writ-
ten what almost no one can understand, you cannot write what everyone can
understand. Quite simply, no one who matters will read you if you do not
have the scientiﬁc reputation to give you the credentials.
My last memory of Professor Tinbergen was in Netherlands itself. I was
awarded an Honorary Degree at the 75th Anniversary celebration of Eras-
mus University: a wonderful event where the Rectors of many Scandinavian
countries were in attendance. Professor Loet Mennes had organized a scien-
tiﬁc conference in my honor; and Professor Tinbergen came in an act of kind-
ness and friendship. I now treasure a splendid photograph of him and me in
conversation at that conference.1
I am certain that, if he were alive today, he would be deeply involved in
the great debates over Globalization in which we ﬁnd ourselves. So, I have
decided to address the issues that the anti-Globalization critics have raised,
since they dominate much of the public space, particularly in the rich coun-
tries. I wish to argue that the critics of Globalization are mistaken.
To respond adequately to the critics of Globalization, however, it is useful
to recall what Rabbi Hillel, who lived in the time of Herod, said: “If I am not
for myself, then who will be for me? And when I am only for myself, what am
I?” (He did go on to add: “And, if not now, when?,” a prescription that has
less appeal, I am afraid, to many who would rather follow St. Augustine who
famously said: “Dear God, grant me chastity, but not yet”).
What the Rabbi was saying was that we have, or must have, both altruism and
self-interest to deﬁne our lives. But, in truth, on this spectrum, few lie in the cen-
ter but tend to gravitate towards one end or the other. And this is just what we
ﬁnd among the critics of Globalization. Several are altruistic; they proceed from
empathy, thinking thatGlobalization ismalign in its impact onhumanity, onwhat
might be called “social issues.” But a large number are also proceeding instead
from self-interest, actuated by fear. These include mainly the labor unions that
fear their wages and standards will collapse with Globalization, and others who
fear that the overall prosperity of their nation is also at risk.
As it happens, both sets of critics are mistaken; and so let me treat each
separately, starting with the criticisms based on altruism and empathy, where
1 It is on my website www.columbia.edu/∼jb38.
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I will conclude that, instead of lacking a Human Face, Globalization Has a
Human Face.
2 ALTRUISM AND EMPATHY
In May 2004, I published my book, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford),
addressing the questions raised by the critics of Globalization. Since my dis-
tinguished colleague Joe Stiglitz (who, I notice, has also given the Tinber-
gen Lecture) had written in 2002 his book, Globalization and Its Discontents,
which was inevitably contrasted with mine, I was repeatedly asked whether
mine was a riposte to his. When I was in Mexico, for instance, at a big
seminar on Globalization soon after, I was told from the ﬂoor that Profes-
sor Stiglitz had just been through and was my Lecture prompted by his?
I answered that my radical teacher Joan Robinson, when she had heard that
Milton Friedman had been through many Indian campuses, had gotten hold
of his itinerary and had followed it from campus to campus so as to undo
the damage done by Friedman. I added that, as it happened, I was not even
aware that Stiglitz had just talked in Mexico City and my visit was entirely
unrelated to his, but now that I happened to be following him, I would cer-
tainly use the opportunity to undo the damage he was busy inﬂicting on the
Mexicans and indeed worldwide.2
My book, in any event, dealt uniquely with the “social impact” ques-
tions which the young students and the civil society groups were raising. It
was prompted by the WTO Ministerial Meeting in November 1999 when the
attempt at launching the ﬁrst WTO Round of multilateral negotiations sank
under the onslaught of massive demonstrations and disruptions matched by
the Clinton Administration’s lack of preparation to confront and contain the
mayhem. As I debated civil society leaders, including Ralph Nader in the
Town Hall, and appeared on the opening Panel for NGOs (which had to be
postponed to the afternoon because of a bomb threat) with Pascal Lamy,
Clare Short, Charlene Barshefsky, Alec Erwin and other Trade Ministers, and
then talked with the demonstrators on the streets, I felt that these were not
people who were worried about whether Free Trade was good for aggregate
GNP and prosperity or whether Protection was more appropriate.
Rather, they were concerned with what might be called the social impli-
cations of economic globalization. They were concerned, indeed were con-
vinced, that Globalization put us behind on several “citizens’ issues” such
as the environment, indigenous culture (a la President Evo Morales) and
2 It is astonishing how easily a Nobel Prize can be used as a weapon of mass destruction
in countries where populists are looking for any well-known economist to be cited, no matter
whether he knows anything about the subject, to make their assertions credible to the pop-
ulation at large, and where often the local elites have little scientiﬁc knowledge to challenge
such economists.
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mainstream culture (a la Monsieur Bove), democracy, poverty in the poor
countries and child labor there as well. To use the phraseology that Bill Clinton,
Gerhard Schroeder and Tony Blair made fashionable, they claimed that
Globalization Lacks a Human Face. But was this true?
My2004bookwaspreciselyaddressed to thisoverriding issue.Beforeanalyzing
this issue, however, I tried to understand what had brought about the remarkable
growth of altruistic concerns, much of it from the idealistic young. I found the
explanation largely in what I called the “inversion of Hume’s concentric circles”.
David Hume and Adam Smith were both members of the Scottish Enlighten-
ment. Both had written how distance diminished empathy. In a classic passage,
Adam Smith had written in The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1760 that a Euro-
pean man of sensibility would continue to snore through the loss of a hundred
million Chinese in an earthquake “provided he never saw them” but “if he was
to lose his little ﬁnger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night.” David Hume
had written of concentric circles of empathy which declined as one went further
from the center. Today, however, we have the death of distance; and television
brings ever closer to us the hitherto-hidden pestilence, famine and tragic afﬂic-
tions of the countless in misery. At the same time, as the political scientist Robert
Putnam has argued, there is increasing tendency for civic life to decline in com-
munities, that Americans in particular no longer “bowl together.” So, the out-
ermost circle has become the innermost circle, whereas the innermost circle is
now beginning to be the outermost circle. The idealist young therefore are agi-
tated and animated by the afﬂictions that they witness close at hand today; and
they cry out for solutions, which they often ﬁnd in anti-globalization rhetoric and
advocacy.
By looking at virtually every social concern I could lay my hands on,
I argued that Globalization, by and large, advanced these social agendas
instead of handicapping them. In short, Globalization Has a Human face.
I can only hint at the kinds of argumentation and evidence that I marshaled
to arrive at this startling conclusion.
Thus, take the wage differential against women. Take the phenomenon
that, for the same type of work and the same qualiﬁcations, a ﬁrm pays men
more than women. Using Gary Becker’s theory of price and prejudice, we
may hypothesize that the willingness of ﬁrms to pay more for equally qual-
iﬁed men will begin to shrink once they face stiff international competition.
So, in traded industries, you would see the wage differential closing faster
than in non-traded industries. Lo and behold, that is just what two splen-
did women economists, who did their dissertation at Harvard some years ago,
found to be the case in US over a long period. Globalization, in the shape of
trade, was a force for good, not harm.
But take the differential in pay that comes, not at the level of the ﬁrm,
but because women traditionally have been conﬁned to jobs that pay less:
like teaching and nursing. But even here, take the example of Japanese
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multinationals. In Japan the glass ceiling beyond which women cannot go
used to be so low that women could barely stand up! One went to Japan and
found that, in a land that produced the world’s ﬁrst great female novelist Lady
Murasaki in 11th century, today the women typically were either housewives or
in jobs such a bringing tea while the men who were executives talked and nego-
tiated. When Japanese multinationals started going abroad in massive numbers
in late 1980s, the men of course remained executives. But their wives who lived
in New York, Paris, Rome and London, suddenly saw how Western men treated
their wives differently and how the women were upwardly mobile in business
and other occupations. That turned them into powerful agents of change when
they returned. And so now we have had Madame Ogata as the UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees, Madame Tanaka as the Foreign Minister and many
women getting into the Diet and also rising in executive ranks. Japanese invest-
ment abroad was among the phenomena that fostered the change in attitudes
that led to the promotion of equality for Japanese women.3
I might simply add one more vignette from my Globalization book, since
that is also an area where the critics get things exactly wrong. This relates to
whether Globalization in the shape of trade and multinationals helps reduce
child labor in the poor countries, or accentuates the phenomenon. Suppose
that the removal of trade barriers, whether one’s own or foreign, leads to
trade expansion and hence to increased incomes: as much evidence shows.
The question then is: will parents be wicked and say: now that we can make
more money through exports, we will take the ﬁfth child out of school and
out her into work; or will they act as virtuous parents who will instead say:
now that we have more income, we will take the ﬁfth child out of work and
put her into school instead? As it happens, economists often talk about incen-
tives rather than values
And this too reinforces the argument in favor of parents being virtuous.
Why? Because, many studies show that the economic returns to primary edu-
cation are high but that, in the absence of perfect credit markets, poor par-
ents cannot borrow to send their children to school even when proﬁtable. In
short, when parents are credit-constrained, the infusion of extra cash through
3 This trend has also been helped by the increasing ﬂow of Japanese students to the West,
where they learn our way of life and our values. Thus, the early Japanese students used to be
deferential and called me “sensei,” the revered teacher: I sometimes joke that I used to love it
as no American students would ever do that! But now, they put their feet on the table like the
American students and even blow those horrid bubbles from their chewing gums. This “accul-
turation” of Japan is a gathering force that shows itself up in several ways. I have described the
phenomenon by titling a 1994 Foreign Affairs article of mine, on the US-Japan trade negotia-
tions where the Japanese refused to accept demands for import targets, “Samurai No More”:
our negotiators thought they were dealing with the samurai when in fact they were dealing with
GIs. Another apt metaphor is: “Crossing Against the Light”: whereas the traditional Japanese
dutifully waited for the green trafﬁc light to ﬂash before they crossed a road, now they are like
New Yorkers dashing across despite red and yellow lights.
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Globalization will enable the parents to send more children to primary schools
than to farm work. The evidence, from many empirical studies, surveyed in
Chap. 6 of my Globalization book, shows precisely that. And some of the
studies show that the shift to schooling beneﬁted girls as well, yielding a dou-
ble dividend.
3 SELF-INTEREST AND FEAR
But if the concerns about Globalization that proceed from altruism and
empathy can be laid to rest, those arising from self-interest and fear are not
so easily dismissed, though they are even less grounded in objective reality.
The fear of trade and multinationals today particularly afﬂicts the rich
countries, where many are afraid that economic prosperity is imperiled by
trade with the poor countries and additionally the working classes and the
unions typically fear that their wages and standards are in peril from trade
with the poor countries – it was only a few decades ago that the fear was
rampant among the poor countries that the poor countries were in such peril
from trade with the rich countries: how ironic this seems. But a few econo-
mists (the principal one being Stiglitz) and some cash-rich NGOs (principally
Oxfam which seems to have been misled in turn by Stiglitz) have worked hard
to renew the fear among the poor countries as well. Let me therefore urge you
to read the extended analysis and empirical evidence that I have produced,
on the beneﬁts of trade for prosperity in the poor countries, in Chap. 5 of
my book, and on the need to discount the alleged adverse effect of trade on
wages and labor standards in the rich countries, in Chap. 10 of the book.
But let me add a few salient points here, on the question of the relationship
between trade and prosperity, while dealing with the question of wages and
labor standards more robustly later. I will also start with conventional wor-
ries; and then I will address worries (such as the fear of India and China) that
have emerged in recent years, reinforcing the old concerns, in regard to both
overall prosperity and wages.
3.1 Prosperity from Trade
First, my colleague Professor Arvind Panagariya has noted that, if one exam-
ines the growth and trade record (where available) of rich and poor countries
for nearly forty years in the postwar period, you see a remarkable phenome-
non. The “economic miracle” countries which averaged a high annual growth
rate of per capita income at about 3%, also showed similar growth in their
trade; and the “economic debacle” countries that experienced negligible or
even negative growth rates were also characterized by similarly dismal trade
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performance.4 Now, this does not necessarily imply that trade led to growth
instead of the other way around.
But anyone who has studied the experience of developing countries in
depth knows, and I know because I have participated in two major projects
(one where I was a country co-author and one which I co-directed) in 1960s
and 1970s of trade and development policies of several countries, the argu-
ment that growth happened independently of trade, which simply followed as
a “trickle-down” effect of growth, is little short of crazy.5 But this area does
invite entry by crazy people
Or it attracts people who are not crazy but act as if they were because the
market incentives are such today that they reward craziness. It is tempting to
think that the few dissenters on the efﬁcacy of trade in promoting prosperity
are like the dissenters such as Vaclav Havel who were persecuted in the erst-
while communist countries. But our trade and globalization dissenters lead
very comfortable lives instead because their dissent gets amply rewarded. The
answer lies in the economics of value. If there are only two of you (say Stiglitz
and Rodrik) and all economists are on the other side, your scarcity value is
immense. You are on the plane to Oslo, Mumbai, Tokyo, indeed every exotic
place that is holding a Conference on Globalization and is looking for an
anti-Globalization voice!
Second, note that it is possible to observe periods, which may last over
almost two decades in rare cases, where autarky and high growth rates may
be observed together. But it is impossible to ﬁnd cases where this has been a
“sustainable” relationship over very long periods. The Soviet Union collapsed
after making many economists, including me at one stage, believe that its
autarky was no barrier. Well, just look at a chart on Soviet Russia’s steadily
declining growth rate in the face of huge investment rates6 after a huge spurt
in 1920s and 1930s, and you see that declining productivity that must partly
be attributed to a virtually closed economy and additionally to the rigidity of
central planning laced with massive restrictions on production and investment
that ﬁnally caught up with those folks.
But let me also tell you a funny, and true, story about my Cambridge
teacher Joan Robinson. Long ago, when Jan Myrdal was writing his remark-
able Report from a Chinese Village (1965), she and Gus Ranis of Yale, one a
radical and the other a mainstream economist, were overheard agreeing that
Korea was an economic miracle. How could this harmony have arisen? It
4 See Arvind Panagariya, “Miracles and Debacles: In Defense of Trade Openness”, The
World Economy, Vol. 27(8), August 2004, pp. 1149–71.
5 I use the word “crazy,” which is not very polite, in the tradition of Keynes who wrote
famously that it would be crazy to prefer bilateral trade agreements to multilateralism in trade.
6 See, for instance, the Chart on the Soviet growth rates in Padma Desai’s Introduc-
tory Chapter in her Soviet Economy: Problems and Prospects, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987;
Chart 1.1.
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turned out that she was thinking of North Korea whereas Ranis was talking
about South Korea. Now, after over a quarter of a century, we know who was
right: North Korea simply failed to sustain its high growth rate. Autarky, and
total lack of political and economic freedoms, turned the short-run miracle
into a debacle.7
Third, much is made these days of the cliche´ that “one (shoe) size does
not ﬁt all,” implying that general advice that trade is good is unsound and
that we must vary the prescription with each country, presumably advocat-
ing protection here and there, on an ad hoc basis, and without an overarch-
ing philosophy that progress toward freeing trade was desirable. This sounds
so right; but it is downright shallow and silly. Science, and good policy,
require that certain general propositions be taken as guiding principles, as dis-
tinct from reliance on ad hoc prescriptions. One has to decide whether one
wants to go barefoot or wear shoes. And once one decides to wear shoes,
the shoe size will inevitably tend to vary, as the policy gets grounded in real-
ity. Thus, one has to decide whether the central policy has to be openness or
autarky. After the postwar experience, clearly good policymaking requires a
policy of freer trade. But this does not mean that the actual freeing of trade
must not take into account the political and economic difﬁculties that may
attend the transition from one system to another: the transition to freer trade,
and working with an open economy, require policy and institutional support
that have in fact been the subject of rich analysis by trade economists for
decades.8
3.2 Globalization: Trade, Immigration and Wages
The long-standing stagnation, or at best very sluggish rise, in worker’s earn-
ings in US has given rise to the fear that Globalization, involving trade with
the poor countries and also illegal unskilled immigration from them, is at the
7 There is consensus now that the cocktail made with three liqueurs – greater reliance on
markets, political democracy, and openness to the world economy – is enormously produc-
tive of prosperity and hence of attack on poverty. Both Soviet Union and North Korea
rejected the cocktail, foregoing markets, denying democracy and embracing autarky. In this
regard, see also the discussion in my 1993 Rajiv Gandhi Memorial Lecture, Democracy and
Development, reprinted in my essays, A Stream of Windows, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press
2000.
8 In fact, I and other trade economists began writing about the rationale for, and design of,
adjustment assistance in import-competing industries in 1970s. I have often lectured also about
the need to remedy the absence of such a safety net in the poor countries, which had gener-
ally been exempted from reciprocity requirements at the GATT under the Special & Differen-
tial Treatment provisions, and therefore were not liberalizing and hence had traditionally little
need for the safety net. Now that they have seen the beneﬁts of trade liberalization, and would
like to proﬁt from trade liberalization, many are fearful to move on to the high wire when
there is no safety net.
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heart of the problem. Yet, this causation is hard to take at face value, no mat-
ter how plausible it seems to many in the rich countries.
First, all empirical studies, including those done by some of today’s top
trade economists (such as Paul Krugman and Robert Feenstra), show that the
adverse effect of trade on wages is not substantial. My own empirical inves-
tigation, reported also in Chapt. 10 of my Globalization book, in fact argues
that the effect of trade with poor countries may even have been to moder-
ate the downward pressure on wages that rapid unskilled-labor-saving techni-
cal change would have caused.9
Second, the same goes for the econometric studies by the best labor econ-
omists today, regarding the effects of inﬂux of unskilled illegal immigrants
into the United States. The latest study by George Borjas (no friend of illegal
immigrants) and Larry Katz, both of Harvard, once necessary adjustments
are made, also shows a virtually negligible impact on US workers’ wages.
So, despite the popular fears, Globalization does not appear to be the
cause of the problem. What then explains the disturbing situation regarding
wages? Can it be that Globalization has signiﬁcantly reduced the bargaining
ability of workers and thus put a downward pressure on wages? I strongly
doubt this. First, the argument is not relevant when employers and workers
are in a competitive market and workers must be paid the going wage. As
it happens, only under 10% of the workers in the private sector in the US
are now unionized. Second, if it is claimed that acceleration in Globalization
has decimated unionization, that is dubious. The decline in unionization has
been going on for longer than the last two decades of Globalization, shows
no dramatic acceleration in the last two decades, and is to be attributed to
the union-unfriendly provisions of the half-century-old Taft-Hartley provi-
sions that crippled the ability to strike. Third, it seems plausible that union-
ization has also suffered because fewer workers now expect that unions can
deliver higher wages. In the public sector, the wages are squeezed because of
budget constraints: as the recent NY Transit strike showed, the public utilities
are increasingly unable to raise the price of services or to get more subsidies
to ﬁnance losses and therefore the ability of unions in such a situation to get
more for their workers is crippled. Again, increasing numbers work at home,
in no small measure due to technical change such as on-line transactions, that
facilitates such decentralized work, in a return to the pre-factory-work era,
and are therefore less amenable to unionization.
Again, can we turn to yet another element of Globalization for an expla-
nation? Has the outﬂow of Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) to the poor
countries with cheap labor caused a decline in the capital which works at
9 This is also the conclusion of Robert Feenstra and Gordon Hanson, reviewed in my book,
in their study of outsourcing of components to Mexico from US and its effects on US wages.
While the wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers rises, the real wage of the
unskilled rises as well.
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home with unskilled labor and hence to a decline in wages? But, as I look
at the data, US has received more or less as much equity investment as it has
lost over the last two decades. One cannot just look at one side of the ledger;
I might add that I was once in a BBC radio debate with the Mayor of the
French town which had lost its Hoover factory to England. He was lamenting
the loss and holding up multinationals as somewhat wicked in their pursuit
of proﬁts. So, I told him: Mr. Mayor, Hoover is an American ﬁrm. When it
came to your town, you applauded. Now that they have traveled on, you are
agitated. You cannot have it both ways. Again, I often recall the remarkable
example of Route I-95 going through the Carolinas in US. Along a stretch,
several jobs have been lost in textiles which have now traveled further south
or to other countries. But then, many German ﬁrms have come in, offsetting
this outﬂow. That segment of I-95 is now called the Autobahn! Indeed, as
I argue below, the econometric evidence on location by multinationals does
not show that cheap labor is a big draw; and many other factors produc-
ing competitiveness are at play, making the rich countries a major player and
attraction in the inﬂow of equity investments by multinationals.
So, in lieu of Globalization as the culprit, one has to fall back on the argu-
ment that substantial unskilled-labor-saving technical change is putting pres-
sure on the wages of the unskilled. Technical change (except for the Green
Revolution where the new seeds led to an increased demand for landless labor
and to increase in their real wages because the use of irrigation and fertilizers
with the new seeds led to more intensive use of land through multiple shifts)
happens to be continually economizing on the use of unskilled labor. Much
empirical argumentation and evidence exists on this, coming from world-class
economists such as Alan Krueger of Princeton. But, as always, anecdotes
(which obviously cannot substitute for systematic evidence) can make this
point come alive.10
The effect of technical change in increasing the demand for skilled and
reducing that for unskilled, labor today can be illustrated by two examples.
First, to take an example from my own, Professorial life, secretaries are
increasingly hard to get from the university administration on campuses.
Instead, universities now offer you computers. Whereas secretaries are gen-
erally semi-skilled – though highly educated and gifted females often did
become secretaries because they had few other options because of traditional
10 The use of anecdotes and bon mots is a device for making abstruse economic arguments
accessible and plausible to the public at large. Wit, irony and even sarcasm are excellent aides
in putting one’s points across to the public at large. I might also add that there is now a
fetish, among even serious economists like Dani Rodrik, Jeffrey Sachs and Robert Barro (all
associated with Harvard University, strangely enough), for mindless cross-country regressions
which serve as a substitute for analysis. The use of these regressions as “evidence,” and the
pretense that they are superior to, and a desirable substitute for conceptual and analytical
arguments – Dani Rodrik once described conceptual analysis as “rhetoric” and his regressions
as “evidence,” committing two errors in one breath – are increasingly coming under ﬁre.
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role-playing that militated against their working in the higher-paid occupa-
tions – the computers have to be looked after, and frequently ﬁxed for fail-
ure (especially when one has a deadline) by “electronic plumbers” who are
skilled and get paid much more. So the rapid spread of computers is steadily
reducing demand for secretaries and increasing the demand for the electronic
plumbers.
A more striking example comes from Charlie Chaplin’s famous ﬁlm,
Modern Times. You will recall how he goes berserk on the assembly line, the
mechanical motion of turning the spanner ﬁnally getting to him (in a throw-
back to Adam Smith’s famous observation that the division of labor, and con-
centration on repetitive, narrow tasks could turn workers into morons and
that education for them had to provide the antidote).
Suppose that you take your child to see the ﬁlm and she asks you: Daddy,
take me to see an assembly line so I can actually see the people working at it.
Well, it is going to be increasingly difﬁcult to ﬁnd such an assembly line for
your child to see. Yes, there are assembly lines today; but they are without
workers; they are managed by computers in a glass cage above, with highly
skilled engineers in charge. The disoriented Charlie Chaplins have increasingly
disappeared, at least from the assembly lines. Amusingly, this was brought
home to Americans when, having decided to investigate the production of
potato and semiconductor chips because of the widespread perception that
potato chips (much like in the days when they were made by one’s mother in
the kitchen before cholesterol-consciousness arrived to kill such indulgence)
were produced by primitive techniques and semiconductors were made with
advanced technology, a reporter found that the facts were the other way
around. He visited a factory that produced semiconductors and found that it
involved moronic ﬁtting of little wires onto small boards, whereas the Prin-
gles factory he visited for potato chips was fully automated on its assembly
line, with Pringles ﬁtting beautifully on one another, each a total replica of
the other, in the red and green boxes one ﬁnds in mini-bars in hotels.
The facts are that this is rapidly occurring in US, and in other rich coun-
tries, as technical change is quickly spreading through the system. This natu-
rally creates, in the short-run, pressure on the jobs and wages of the workers
being displaced.
But we know from past experience with technical change that we usually
get a J-curve where, as productivity increase takes hold, it will (except in cases
where macroeconomic difﬁculties may occur and are not addressed by mac-
roeconomic remedies) get to increase the wages: so that a Luddite response is
hardly called for. So, why has there been no such effect, at least a signiﬁcant
effect, in the statistics on wages for almost two decades?
I suspect that the answer lies in the intensity of displacement of unskilled
labor by IT-based technical change – its potency is dramatic, as is evi-
dent from daily experience of nearly everyone – and in the fact that it
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is continuous now, unlike discrete changes like the invention of the steam
engine. So, before the workers get on to the rising part of the J-curve, they
run into yet more such technical change, so that the working class gets to
go from one declining segment of the J-curve to another, to yet another. The
pressure on wages gets to be relentless, lasting over longer periods than in ear-
lier experience with unskilled-labor-saving technical change. But this technical
change, which proceeds like a tsunami, has nothing to do with Globalization.
4 NEW ARGUMENTS RAISING FEAR OF GLOBALIZATION
Recently, however, there have been renewed fears of Globalization that need
to be addressed. They come from, and not wittingly, from most unlikely
sources. One is paradoxically from the greatest economist alive today, Paul
Samuelson, a proponent of free trade; the other comes from the proliﬁc
pro-Globalization journalist Tom Friedman.
5 THE SAMUELSON QUESTION
Writing in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Professor Samuelson chided
the proponents of Globalization as failing to realize that external changes,
such as the growth of China and India, could diminish the gains from trade
and hence be harmful. He is doubtless right that external, exogenous changes
can harm; equally, they can help. Imagine you are in Miami and the hurricane
arrives, creating devastation. But you can also imagine that in India, the mon-
soon is good and leads to an abundant harvest. Trade economists have long
discussed the likelihood of these opposed possibilities. The issues were at the
forefront during the years of the Dollar Shortage after 2nd World War when
Europeans thought that external, exogenous growth of US productivity was a
source of pressure on European incomes and the exchange rate. The downside
possibility resurfaced in 1980s when the fear of a rising Japan created similar
fears in US. Now, the rise of India and China has resurrected similar fears.
Will their accumulation of capital and of know-how reduce our gains from
trade since we specialize in producing and exporting goods that use skills and
capital intensively?
Professor Samuelson is dead right in raising this question; perhaps in the
public debate on Globalization, this possibility has been downplayed. But
where he was misinterpreted widely is in the assumption that, when gains
from trade diminish because of such exogenous changes abroad, the policy
response must be to abandon free trade and to embrace protection. Take the
Miami example. If its response to the devastation from the hurricane is to
shut off trade with the world, the anguish of its citizens will only worsen.
It is astonishing, but not surprising, how the protectionists ﬂocked to him,
a free trader, with no comprehension of Samuelson’s argumentation, arguing
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that the world’s most eminent economist had “conceded” that free trade was
problematic.
But then, if he certainly does not advocate protectionism, Samuelson does
raise the question which bothers many who fear the rise of India and China
and the effect of this, if not on our wages, at least on our economic prosper-
ity. For, if the gains from trade diminish, that does mean reduced prosperity.
But here, let me say that there are reasons to think that his downside scenario
is not likely.
To see this perhaps most clearly, get back to the argument that, as India
and China (the chief among the developing countries who strike fear in this
regard) accumulate capital and know-how, i.e. as the rich countries and the
erstwhile poor countries get to be “more similar” in their factor endowments,
the gains from trade will diminish because the rich countries’ exports will fall
in price. But what happens, in fact, as countries get similar? Trade now breaks
out in “similar goods”; what we economists call “intra-industry trade”grows.
Yet another way of putting it is to say that trade in “variety’ breaks out.
You can see it in the fashion trade, for example. Walk down Madison Ave-
nue in New York, for example, and you see, cheek by jowl, Georgio Armani,
Calvin Klein, Pierre Cardin, Yves St Laurent and Kenzo competing and co-
existing: none, incidentally, seeks protection from its “home country.” There
is much trade in similar products, with producers across countries often at
different places on the spectrum of products that we call an industry.
But we have not merely casual empiricism on the issue. Pioneering empiri-
cal work by my MIT student Robert Feenstra, and by my Columbia colleague
David Weinstein, has demonstrated that these gains from similar products are
huge today. Once this is factored in, Professor Samuelson’s fears of the down-
side to our prosperity from the rise of China and India seem implausible.11
6 TOM FRIEDMAN: THE EARTH IS NOT FLAT
Yet another source of recent worries about the risk to the rich countries from
the rise of India and China has come from Tom Friedman’s latest book, The
Earth is Flat which, despite critical reviews in The Financial Times and in
The Economist (which said with a display of good taste that it was better to
read my Globalization book instead, a recommendation that they repeated in
the course of an uncomplimentary review of Stiglitz’s second and even more
unsuccessful attempt at writing on Globalization), has been a bestseller for
months.
Friedman essentially conjures up a vision where he has these countries,
with high technology and low wages, come marching down a ﬂat road like
11 Assar Lindbeck, in his recent writings on China, has also argued plausibly that even tradi-
tional trade, and not just trade in variety, can be conﬁdently expected to grow between China
and India, on the one hand, and the rich countries of today.
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Russell Crowe’s Roman legions and take every job away from the rich coun-
tries. He often quotes the remarkable entrepreneurs in India’s Silicon Valley
in Bangalore, who say, quite correctly: we can do anything that Americans
can do, which is no idle boast. But the reader translates that as the alto-
gether different and erroneous proposition: Indians will therefore wind up
doing everything that the Americans presently do. The latter scares the hell
out of Americans. But it abolishes the notion of comparative advantage and
therefore it is totally wrong.
Let me put this criticism in a way that you can see at once. Do we really
have a ﬂat road? What ever happened to potholes and to mountains that the
road has to skirt around or tunnel through? Take just two examples as to
why countries do not travel on the same ﬂat road. Take China and India.
Both countries have dramatically improved their growth rates, and their pov-
erty, by abandoning the old policy framework that included autarkic attitudes
to Globalization regarding trade and inward direct equity investments. You
would expect them to have similar performance levels in modern sectors like
IT software. But India is way ahead on it. Why? The answer surely lies in the
differential politics of India and China. Democratic India rejoices in IT soft-
ware and already is a major force in world commerce in it. But authoritarian
China is fearful of the seditious implications of letting free information ﬂows
and has put up roadblocks that inhibit the growth of this sector. As I say in
my Globalization book, the personal computer (PC) is incompatible with the
the Communist Party (CP).
But if this lack of “ﬂatness,” or difference in comparative advantage, arises
from political diversity, I suspect that the case of Japan illustrates the differ-
ences that arise culturally.12 Japan in 1980s and early 1990s aroused similar
fears: that they would take over everything we were doing in the rich coun-
tries. The fears were differently premised and had little to do with Japan’s
huge size (for it is an island economy) or with Japan’s “low” wages, which
are the fears that arise regarding India and China. The fear of Japan instead
had much to do with the nation’s meteoric rise in world trade and perfor-
mance just as India and China’s dazzling performance does today. But, in the
end, they could not master the ﬁnancial sector, while retaining their prow-
ess in manufacturing. The reason seems to be cultural. Excellence at design,
attention to craftsmanship and meticulousness in attention to consumer sat-
isfaction, belying the previous notion that Japan could only produce shoddy
products, have led to continuing dominance at the upper end of quality pro-
duction. But these qualities do not help you in fast-moving modern ﬁnance
where dithering and dilatory responses mean that you lose to others whose
12 Culture, of course, is not immutable and changes over time, including in response to
changing economic opportunities and challenges. But this does not mean that cultures are
different at any point of time, yielding comparative advantage differences that imply that the
world is not ﬂat.
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responses are faster. For nearly two decades, Japan has faltered because its
way of doing business has not given it comparative advantage in managing
the ﬁnancial sector. This has spilled over into macroeconomic failure as well.
Now, Japan is busy addressing this issue by opening up to foreign banks and
investment in its ﬁnancial sector, hoping to learn through foreign infusion the
different culture that the modern ﬁnancial sector requires.
So, contrary to what is feared, there is no reason to think that compara-
tive advantage is going to disappear: that the world is ﬂat! Two further points
need to be made. As my student Paul Krugman has emphasized, national
competitiveness is a fallacious construct. If India and China have low wages,
the exchange rate can adjust to offset that advantage; or, with ﬁxed exchange
rates, other (not so good) mechanisms will be triggered to adjust the trade
balance and to have comparative advantage resurface. But there is also the
important point that econometric studies on the location decisions of multi-
nationals (when all industries are considered) typically show that factors other
than cheap labor are important; concern about lower wages is simply a fetish.
Moreover, it is a mistake to think that, just because wages are low, the
sheer size of the population of India and China will ensure that they will
remain low despite rapid growth. All observers, whatever their political per-
suasion, are agreed that over two decades of two-digit growth in the four
provinces on the East Coast of China have seen a rapid increase in the
demand for labor whereas the kicking-in of the one-child policy and the
slow inﬂux of workers from the hinterland (partly because there are many
obstacles put in the path of rural-urban migration by the authorities) have
combined to raise wages and improve working conditions. Equally, in India,
when the outsourcing of “long distance” or arm’s-length services such as call-
answer services is considered, the wages have been rising there too. In fact, if
you look at the population in the age cohort for College, only about a tenth
actually goes to College. Of that, still a smaller fraction studies in English.13
Of that a small fraction can speak English. Of that, again, a small fraction
can speak English in a way we can understand. Yes, the queues out side call
centers are big; but queuing does not guarantee that you can do the job that
is necessary.
Then again, whereas my good friend Richard Freeman of Harvard Univer-
sity talks these days of the large numbers of engineers graduating in India
and China, larger than those in US, this does not allow for quality of the
education they have received. It will be many years before even a small
13 In fact, it was startling to see that the Government of Karnataka where India’s Silicon
Valley is located, passed legislation in September 2006, throwing out English from its pub-
lic sector schools! Advertised as a measure aimed at helping the poor, it is in fact a dagger
aimed at them: they want to learn English, but will not be able to, whereas the parents who
can afford it will send their children to private schools or hire private tutors to teach English
to their children.
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fraction of these will come up to snuff. Besides, there are lots of local tasks
such as bridge repairs and road-building, and construction, which absorbs a
gigantic fraction of these engineers; and in China, the stocks of engineers was
badly depleted by the Cultural Revolution and a sizeable fraction of the cur-
rent graduates must go toward rebuilding these stocks. In short, the alarm-
ist interpretations and predictions of the growth of skilled personnel in China
and India and of the threat it poses to rich-country jobs through diminished
gains from trade, are to be seriously discounted. Our comparative advantage
in skills-intensive jobs is by no means going to disappear in the foreseeable
future.
7 A DIFFERENT METAPHOR: KALEIDOSCOPIC COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
But if comparative advantage is not dead – indeed it cannot die in the world
as we know it – the real problem is that it has become volatile. Friedman’s
metaphor is wrong: the world is not ﬂat any more than it was when the ﬂat-
earthers of antiquity were challenged by Pythagoras in sixth century BC. The
appropriate metaphor is different: the world is now characterized by what
I call “kaleidoscopic comparative advantage.”
As it happens, this volatility, or “knife-edge” property of specialization,
where you have it today and you have lost it to a rival tomorrow and may
then get it back the day after tomorrow, is itself due to the fact that almost
no CEO in traded services and goods leads a comfortable life now. The
“thick” margins of competitive advantage have practically disappeared from.
When William of Orange and Queen Mary grew oranges in the greenhouses
at Hampton Court, no one lost sleep in Haifa where the oranges could
grow in nature in abundance. Today, the competitive margins have shrunk for
several reasons that I identiﬁed 10 years ago in a review article in 1997 in
The New Republic, titled “A New Epoch?” I described how the competitive
margins had begun to shrink because, to cite some principal phenomena,
multinationals could go today to many locations which therefore had access
to their technology, interest rates were increasingly similar due to the grow-
ing integration of ﬁnancial markets, many countries were building educational
institutions where students could read the same textbooks as only in a few
countries earlier, and students increasingly were studying abroad and acquir-
ing technical know-how at the world level. At the same time, there were
many countries at active play in the international markets today because trade
barriers had been increasingly dismantled, either through reciprocal cuts in
trade negotiations or due to unilateral actions inspired by the realization that
protectionism was harmful to one’s economic health.
Where the readers of Friedman are likely to think that competition comes from
India and China, however, my analysis focuses on the fact that it can come from
almost anywhere. CEOs, looking behind them, are very likely to see some rival
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stealing up on them. But that rival need not be from India or China. It can be
from Brazil, from Poland, from France, indeed from a number of trading coun-
tries. But there is certainly going to be someone stealing up on you today; and you
had better be on your toes. The competition today is knife-edge.
Two consequences follow. First, faced with this ferocity of competition, the
temptation is great to ask for protection. But that is a difﬁcult road to travel
as policymakers rarely oblige. But then one can always ask for a different
kind of protection: one can try to “level the playing ﬁeld” by asking that the
rivals from poorer countries and usually lower standards in labor et. al, be
forced to raise them to our levels, so they do not get an “unfair” advantage.
I.e. one can ask for “fair trade.” To put it in terms of the ﬂat world meta-
phor, the response to import competition can take the form of raising the cost
of production of your rivals abroad, so that we do not have a ﬂat world but
rather we have ﬁrms under competitive pressure trying to ﬂatten the world! It
is what I call “export protectionism.”
Second, it is a mug’s game. Even if labor and domestic environmental stan-
dards were equalized to ours in the poor countries, this will never eliminate the
problem of ﬁerce competition today. It is like putting a ﬁnger in the dyke.
8 COPING WITH KALEIDOSCOPIC COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE REQUIRES
SEVERAL POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
So, Friedman is wrong in suggesting that the world is ﬂat and comparative
advantage has disappeared relative to India and China, I am afraid. And so
are the unions and other NGOs who think that raising standards elsewhere
up to those in the rich countries (which incidentally vary among them and,
in US, are nothing to write home about, for that matter) will moderate com-
petition and lead to a more comfortable life.
What then should be our response to Globalization when it is character-
ized by rapidly shifting comparative advantages? The gains from trade are
real; but the volatility requires institutional response and reconstruction of
inherited ways of doing things.
8.1 Security for Workers, No Longer through speciﬁc jobs
If volatility is now a dominant fact of life, unions cannot expect to deﬁne
security for their unskilled workers in terms of speciﬁc jobs. Speciﬁc jobs are
increasingly subject to demise and disappearance. So, the unions must deﬁne
security in terms of workers themselves. This means that the unions must now
get active in getting their members to acquire the tools of mobility from one
job to another. This requires that the unions must now go back to the old
tenets of socialists such as G.D.H.Cole who emphasized the importance of
educating the workers: I recall Ruskin College in Oxford which was doing
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just that. So, workers may enjoy, like many of us, sitting in front of television
sets and drinking beer and eating potato chips as they watch soccer or base-
ball with frenzied attention. But they must be persuaded to go to a Union
school on Saturday or Sunday when they can learn a language or computers
or other skills for 2/3 h every week. This addition to their “portfolio of assets”
will increase their chance of being able to go from a lost job to a new one.
In addition, if jobs are going to be less permanent than they have been,
we must confront the fact that unskilled labor’s wage proﬁle over a lifetime
showed a mild rise, an upward slope, because the ﬁrms tended to impart
human capital on the job to workers who would stay in the job over long
periods. Now, that wage proﬁle is likely to be ﬂatter because, faced with
impermanence, the ﬁrm’s incentive to add human capital to the unskilled
workers it is employing currently is going to be reduced.14 This argument also
calls for initiatives to add human capital through appropriate education for
the unskilled workers today.
8.2 Skilled Labor: Optimal Trajectories of Transition
The same goes for skilled labor. Strangely enough, while the “skill premium”
has grown, also due to technical change that economizes on unskilled labor
but favors skilled labor, the fear of Globalization has spread even to the
skilled who see their jobs being imperiled by the phenomenon. This alarm
spread rapidly through the US when a radiologist US X-rays digitally to
India to be read there: it was then assumed that all radiologists (and then
doctors in all medical specialties) would lose their jobs. But the fact is that
no radiologist has lost his job to date. The outsourcing has been largely to
India and Australia where the time zone differences have made it possible to
get X-rays read while the American doctors sleep or enjoy their weekends (so
that these foreign ﬁrms are aptly called “nighthawks”).
In fact, it is hard to think of a net loss of jobs in the skilled categories
as technical change and shifting circumstances continually throw up demands
for new skills. Thus, even if radiology were to be lost through outsourcing,
can it be doubted that the spread of obesity has led to a vastly increased
demand for doctors in diabetes and cardiology? Besides, the ageing of the
population has led to a hugely increased demand for cosmetic surgery that is
now spreading from women to men. I have betted that even Clint Eastwood
will some day get a face lift, though I doubt if I and he will live long enough
for me to win the bet!
The real problem again is how to facilitate the movement of the skilled from
declining to rising skills. I have proposed that the professional associations, like
14 This implication of volatility of comparative advantage was noted by me in The New
Republic article that I cited earlier.
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the American Medical Association, assist the process by working out “assisted
trajectories of transition” so that if radiologists lose out, then they do not have
to go back to the beginning and work for years to shift to the specialties rising
in demand. Rather, the AMA would work with the doctors to see how the
length of the transition path can be minimized.
8.3 Education: Reducing Excessive Specialization
Again, education, both at the university and less exalted institutions such as
the Community College in US, and in vocational institutions, must ensure
that the ratio of specialized to general technical education be shifted in favour
of the latter. Thus, engineers should not spend the greatest amount of time
learning mechanical engineering and the least amount of time on general
engineering which would embrace more of chemical and electrical engineer-
ing, for instance. In the Soviet Union, where there was no change, engineers
were trained for very speciﬁc specializations where they spent their lives in
an inﬂexible job assignment in a rigidly planned economy. We now have the
problem that we must educate people in skills that have no longer a guaran-
tee of being in permanent demand, and hence they must be endowed with a
good general base, a platform from which they can reassign them from obso-
lete skills to those in new demand.
8.4 The Question of Ageing Societies
I might add that, in ageing societies such as those in many parts of Europe,
the ageing phenomenon creates both opportunities and problems. On the
opportunity side, consider that it leads to new demands for a variety of med-
ical skills: among them, cosmetic surgery which has witnessed a huge surge.
Not merely are women having resort to these procedures; men are increas-
ingly doing so. But, on the problems side, enabling people such as older doc-
tors, where their skills such as radiology might be threatened by outsourcing,
transiting to new skills can be quite difﬁcult. If the demand for Professors of
Economics were to fall off, and there were no tenure, and I lose my job at the
age of 55, for example, I would hate to be told that there are a lot of opportu-
nities for Professorships in Theoretical Physics: it is pretty well impossible for
me to become a Professor of Theoretical Physics at that age! In some cases,
therefore, the challenge of transiting to new skills will be daunting. It is clear,
therefore, that one element of adjustment that might be useful is to make
import-competition-related adjustment assistance amounts and time periods
age-linked.15
15 Of course, the transition to new skills is a problem that can arise from domestic technical
change and consumer demand shifts as well. But, as I argued in my 1988 book on Protec-
tionism, MIT Press, citizens do think that an extra element of assistance is necessary when the
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8.5 Differential Demographics: A Gray Peace Corps
But I also see in modern demographics, and asymmetrical endowment of
skills worldwide, an opportunity to ﬁnd new and fulﬁlling jobs for the ageing
skilled workers of the rich countries. Countries such as Germany and Italy
are no longer reproducing themselves: their women no longer see themselves
as manufacturing babies. At least two consequences follow.
First, these European countries ﬁnd themselves in the same position as
they were when the second World War had decimated their young men and
they developed the gastarbeiter (guest-worker) programs. If properly managed,
this provides an interesting opportunity for the poor countries with workers
that cannot be gainfully employed to send them to the rich countries that
have more jobs than people. I used this fact to advantage when asked on US
television how I felt that Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, an Italian, might become India’s
Prime Minister. I ducked the issue by saying: “Italy is not reproducing itself;
in about 30 years, a quarter of the Italian workforce is expected to be immi-
grants; of these, a large fraction will obviously be Indians; given the high rate
of turnover of Italian Prime Ministers, I can therefore conﬁdently expect that
there will soon be an Indian Prime Minister of Italy; we will then have taken
our revenge!”
Second, regarding skilled workers, the ageing population and retirements,
and the difﬁcult adjustment problems facing the old thanks to obsolescence
of skills due to kaleidoscopic comparative advantage, in Europe and US
can match the huge, unﬁlled needs of African nations for skills of virtually
every type. As we train more Africans, most will surely leave to work in the
rich countries: as I have often remarked, while Indians and Shirley MacLean
believe in a multiplicity of lifetimes, we maximize our welfare in the current
life like everybody else. Eventually, these Africans will return when political
governance has improved, economic growth has taken root and social condi-
tions (such as divorce legislation that matters much to the professional clas-
ses) have changed for the better.
In the meantime, we will long have glaring needs for skills in Africa. I have
argued that these needs can be met by creating a Gray Peace Corps where
retired doctors, agronomists, teachers, nurses, doctors, and people with many
other skills can be sent for periods of two and more years at suitably high
compensation to work in African countries. Again, therefore, supply and need
can meet through cross-border ﬂows, properly organized and managed, easing
in turn the adjustment problems of ageing populations.
disturbance comes from abroad rather than from domestic policy and parametric shifts. This
is not necessarily “xenophobia” but can be explained in other less condemnatory ways.
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8.6 Labor Markets
Then again, in a world of kaleidoscopic comparative advantage, with increased
volatility in specialization, labor market ﬂexibility in hiring and ﬁring becomes
important. When comparative advantage is lost, if workers cannot be laid off,
the cost to the ﬁrm rises signiﬁcantly. So, if the ﬁrms can invest abroad where
labor can be ﬁred when demand fails, the margin will shift in favor of invest-
ing abroad rather than at home. So, we will get the phenomenon, apparently
observable in France and Germany with stringent restrictions or penalties on
ﬁring workers, that the French and German ﬁrms are competitive but they
do not create jobs in their home countries. This seems to be the case also in
Sweden: I have just read the Report by the Swedish Confederation of Indus-
try which highlights this problem persuasively.
Again, when entire ﬁrms disappear and workers enter the search process,
the question arises as to the optimal length of relief and assistance before the
next job is found. Evidently, a safety net has to be provided, on both politi-
cal and economic grounds. But if the workers are supported at high compen-
sation rates and for long periods, the safety net may turn into a hammock,
delaying beyond the optimal the provision of the assistance during the search
process for new jobs.
8.7 Innovation: From Basic Science to Engineering
One ﬁnal thought is necessary. Globalization today reﬂects knife-edge, volatile
comparative advantage for several reasons which I have already detailed. But
one important reason is that when ﬁrms go from basic science, which is largely
unpatented, to engineering new products and processes which can be patented,
the diffusion of that know-how is very swift today. Thus, software diffuses
very rapidly; and intellectual property protection is sought merely with a view
to getting royalties on what cannot be prevented from being diffused.
But when the Schumpeterian monopoly advantages that innovation brings
are eroded rapidly today, in the globalized world, the only way to survive and
prosper is to be continually innovative. Innovation policy then becomes part of
the portfolio of policies to cope with globalization today.
So, I conclude with the observation that Globalization poses institutional
and policy challenges that require a coherent and holistic treatment. The
Netherlands can do no better than to reject the temptation to somehow mud-
dle through: such an option is not a real option. Professor Tinbergen would
have chosen the better path of looking the problems in the eye.
